Smuggling as the "key to a combined market": British American Tobacco in Lebanon. by Nakkash, R & Lee, K
Nakkash, R; Lee, K (2008) Smuggling as the ”key to a combined mar-
ket”: British American Tobacco in Lebanon. Tobacco control, 17 (5).
pp. 324-31. ISSN 0964-4563
Downloaded from: http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/6985/
Usage Guidelines
Please refer to usage guidelines at http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/policies.html or alterna-
tively contact researchonline@lshtm.ac.uk.
Available under license: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/
Smuggling as the ‘‘key to a combined market’’:
British American Tobacco in Lebanon
R Nakkash,1 K Lee2
1 Department of Health
Management and Policy, Center
for Research on Population and
Health, American University of
Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon; 2 Centre
on Global Change and Health,
London School of Hygiene and
Tropical Medicine, London, UK
Correspondence to:
Dr Rima Nakkash, Department of
Health Management and Policy,
Center for Research on
Population and Health, American
University of Beirut, Beirut,
Lebanon; rima.nakkash@aub.
edu.lb
Received 26 February 2008
Accepted 17 July 2008
This paper is freely available
online under the BMJ Journals
unlocked scheme, see http://
tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/info/
unlocked.dtl
ABSTRACT
Objectives: To understand the strategy of British
American Tobacco (BAT) and other transnational tobacco
companies (TTCs) to gain access to the Lebanese market,
which has remained relatively closed under monopoly
ownership and political instability.
Methods: Analysis of internal industry documents, local
language secondary sources and industry publications.
Results: TTCs have relied on legal and illegal channels to
supply the Lebanese market since at least the 1970s.
Available documents suggest smuggling has been an
important component of BAT’s market entry strategy,
transported in substantial quantities via middlemen for
sale in Lebanon and neighbouring countries. TTCs took
advantage of weak and unstable governance, resulting in
uncertainty over the Regie’s legal status, and continued to
supply the contraband trade despite appeals by the
government to cease undermining its revenues. Since the
end of the civil war in the early 1990s, continued
uncertainty about the tobacco monopoly amid political
instability has encouraged TTCs to seek a legal presence
in the country, while continuing to achieve substantial
sales through contraband.
Conclusion: Evidence of the complicity of TTCs in
cigarette smuggling extends to Lebanon and the Middle
East where this trade has especially benefited from weak
governance and chronic political instability. The regional
nature of TTC strategy supports strong international
cooperation under the Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control to tackle the problem.
The Middle East has been targeted by transna-
tional tobacco companies (TTCs) since the 1970s
as a key emerging market because of its young and
growing population. Arab countries have grown,
from 127 million in 1970 to 335 million people in
2007. Around 20% of the population is aged 15–24
years,1 a proportion predicted to increase as the
population increases to 600 million by 2050.2
Between 1990 and 1997, tobacco consumption in
the region grew by 24.3%,3 making it ‘‘one of the
few growing markets in the world for tobacco’’.4
However, scholarly analysis of the tobacco indus-
try in the Middle East remains limited, including
study of industry efforts to expand sales.
Based on industry documents, this paper exam-
ines how TTCs have sought to gain market access
to Lebanon. Lebanon’s relatively liberal attitudes
and geographical location (bordered by Syria and
Israel, and close to Cyprus) have made it a
strategically important market. Smoking preva-
lence in 2002 was 46% for adult males and 35% for
females,5 relatively high compared with 38% and
7%, respectively, in the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) region in 1995.6 The rising rate of
young female smokers in Lebanon is also notable.7
Tobacco, in turn, poses a significant health burden
in Lebanon, accounting for 3500 deaths annually.8
TTCs sought a major presence in the Lebanese
market as early as the 1930s when a French
company purchased assets of the Ottoman Regie
to form the Compagnie Libano-Syrienne des Tabacs.9
Following the end of French rule in 1935, control
was assigned to the French company with
Lebanese shareholders.10 11 This arrangement con-
tinued until the 1950s when the government
returned the Regie Libanaise de Tabacs et Tombacs
(hereafter the Regie) to state ownership, placing it
under the tutelage of the Ministry of Finance in
1959, which exerted strict control of imports,
exports and production.12 This was not intended
as a permanent arrangement, with discussion of a
planned tender in 1961.13 Periodic reviews of the
Regie’s monopoly status have followed, with
resolution hindered by the country’s political
instability and sectarian fragmentation.
The Regie’s legal status has remained uncertain
until the present day.14–16 A key hurdle has been the
entanglement of the tobacco industry with key
factions who historically grant favours to farmers
and Regie employees in exchange for their political
support. Equally important has been government
support for tobacco farmers in southern Lebanon
to keep them on land threatened by Israeli
incursion. The government has also been keen to
protect revenues earned from the tobacco industry.
The goal of the Regie, which employs around 3800
individuals and affects the livelihoods of 40 000–
50 000 people in the agriculture, industrial and
commercial sectors,17 has been a profitable com-
pany that supplies the domestic market and
competes internationally. This complex mix of
competing interests has been complicated by the
civil war (1975–90) and ongoing political instabil-
ity.
Within this context, TTCs have sought access to
this substantial and growing market. Local cigar-
ette brands dominated the market until the 1970s
(two-thirds of supply in 1970), after which imports
by Philip Morris, British American Tobacco (BAT)
and Japan Tobacco grew to 85% of the market by
2000.18 Imports have since grown from 5554
million sticks in 2000 to 9574 million sticks in
2006.19 This analysis shows that smuggling has
played an important part in ensuring the supply of
foreign brands to Lebanon. TTCs have long denied
involvement in the contraband trade,20 which
globally accounted for around 10.7% of sales in
2005.21 However, previous analysis of industry
documents suggests TTC complicity in
Europe,22 23 Asia,24–26 North America27 and Latin
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America.28 In 2003–4, the Eastern Mediterranean Regional
Office (EMRO) of the World Health Organization published
two reports of cigarette smuggling in the region, focused on Iran
and Iraq, based on industry documents accessible at that
time.29 30 Enabled by improved public access, this paper under-
takes a detailed analysis of TTC activity in Lebanon.
Documents suggest that contraband was used by TTCs to
build market share, as well as being a means of furthering
regional expansion. A fuller understanding of this strategy
supports the need to implement the WHO Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) ratified by Lebanon
in 2005, and negotiation of an FCTC protocol on cigarette
smuggling.
METHODS
This paper is based on industry documents obtained online
from the British American Tobacco (BAT) Document Archive
(BATDA) and Legacy Tobacco Documents Library (LTDL), and
on-site from the BAT Guildford Depository. The obstacles to
accessing, and limitations of working with, BAT documents
have been described elsewhere.31–34 Based on an iterative search
strategy, an on-site search at file level was undertaken in 2004 of
the depository’s crude index using keywords of place and
organisational names related to the Middle East. A total of 65
files were reviewed.
Online searches at document level were undertaken between
2004 and 2007 of LTDL and BATDA using keywords generated
from initial searches and secondary sources. These included
names of industry personnel, policy-makers and government
officials; specialist industry terms such as projects and brands;
and relevant business associates. Alternative spellings were also
searched. The progressive growth and search capability of the
BATDA collection,35 36 in particular, permitted systematic
review of BAT documents using recognised euphemisms for
smuggling such as ‘‘transit’’,37 ‘‘duty not paid’’38 and ‘‘general
trade’’ (GT).39 Advanced Boolean searches were undertaken
using combined keywords. A total of 2340 documents were
reviewed.
Documents were indexed in a specialist database to enable
the construction of a historical and thematic narrative. Further
analysis incorporated validation techniques within a hermeneu-
tic process,40 including corroboration of interpretation between
authors. Triangulation of findings was undertaken by supple-
menting industry documents with secondary sources—namely,
newspaper articles and industry publications.
RESULTS
The growth of cigarette smuggling
‘‘[T]o actively promote…[B&W] brands as far as the civil
commotion situation permits’’.41
Documents suggest cigarette smuggling in Lebanon has been a
longstanding problem. An anti-smuggling squad within the
Regie operated as early as the 1930s until 1976, then ceased
during the civil war, before being reinstated in 1993.17 A 1954
BAT report describes ‘‘the Regie…somewhat worried about the
considerable increase in smuggling. Only the day before, fifteen
cases of ‘‘Lucky Strike’’ had been found on the beach near
Beirut, the cases being marked ‘Tangier – in transit’ ’’.42 The
issue is also noted in three unpublished university theses on the
Regie which cite smuggling routes via Gibraltar, Tangiers, Hong
Kong, Limassol, Port Said and Anvers.43–45
It was from the early 1970s that smuggling grew to
significant levels.46 47 In large part, this was due to weakened
government control over customs and excise during the civil
war, coinciding with the plummeting of domestic production
and legal imports by the Regie. As described by Philip Morris,
‘‘[r]ecent difficulties with the Lebanese Monopoly have lowered
orders and resulted in quantity shortages in the normal
imported market’’.48 As legal supplies declined, ‘‘the transit
[contraband] markets have filled the gap’’.48 BAT reported that
‘‘[c]igarette production during the years of the civil war (which
lasted 15–16 years) has come down to practically zero and [legal
and illegal] imports into Lebanon rose to 13–15 billion
cigarettes’’.49
As cheap contraband flooded the market, it created fierce
competition for dwindling supplies of local brands. Threatening
strike action, Regie staff proved unsuccessful at securing
government support for stronger regulation of import prices,
as well as upgrading of manufacturing equipment.50 51 While the
media reported poor financial management by the Regie,52
former director-general Walid Salam saw the failure of the
government to control smuggling as the real problem (interview
with Walid Salam, former Regie director-general, Beirut, 22 May
2006). This is supported by documents that describe direct
appeals by the Lebanese government to TTCs. In 1973, Phillipe
Serhal (director-general Regie) asked Lorillard to ‘‘conform to
the rules of business ethics’’53 and cease supplying smugglers. He
warned that the Regie would ‘‘reconsider our entire policy of
the legal importation of your products for sale in our internal
market’’.53 In 1977 the Regie met with Lorillard again with the
‘‘stated…intention of helping stop transit sales’’.54 It warned
that ‘‘effective April 1977 the Lebanese authorities, with the
backing of the Arab peace forces…were going to do their utmost
to stop all irregular shipments to Lebanon, including jail and
heavy penalty sentences for illegal importers’’.55 Later the same
year, a meeting was held in Paris with representatives of BAT,
Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds (RJR), Rothman’s subsidiary
Tobacco Exporter International, and Liggett and Myers.
Khoury (director-general, Regie) complained that ‘‘50% of
current sales in the Lebanon of imported brands were from
G.T. [general trade] sources’’.56 He requested TTCs not sell to
distributors involved in contraband, and that company agents
identify the sources of transit products.56 In 1978, Jacque Dagher
(director-general, Regie) wrote to the president of BAT’s US
subsidiary Brown & Williamson (B&W), copying to Cyprus-
based distributor Peregrini (see below), the MOF, and the
cultural attache´ of the US embassy in Lebanon. The letter
requested the company ‘‘stop all extra shipment to Cyprus, or
any other country in our Region…with the intent to have them
smuggled into Lebanon’’.57
Despite these appeals, contraband continued to flood the
Lebanese market.58 By 1983, ‘‘[l]egal imports account[ed] for
only about a third of foreign cigarettes entering Lebanon’’.59
Indeed, TTCs saw the civil war as an opportunity to expand
sales in the country and region. B&W’s corporate strategy in
1982 stated that the company would ‘‘actively promote BWIT
[B&W International Tobacco] brands as far as the civil
commotion situation permits’’.41 Its 1989–93 corporate plan
described Lebanon as a growing market because ‘‘local
manufacturing industries remain incapable of satisfying con-
sumer demand vis-a-vis both quantity and quality’’.60 Similarly,
Philip Morris saw contraband as an opportunity to expand
market share: ‘‘In most markets there are manufacturing
capacity shortages necessitating some imports, legal or other-
wise, if demand is to be quantitatively satisfied’’.61 Philip Morris
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would ‘‘[m]aintain flexible pricing policy’’62 given a ‘‘continued
lack of security…to fully exploit the duty-free business and local
products will be unable to regain a significant share of the
market due to the continuation of low prices for imported
products’’.63
The government continued efforts to control smuggling,
given its impact on Regie sales, which ‘‘slowed down due to the
lower price of contraband Marlboro’’64 and, in turn, tax
revenues. One report described government measures ‘‘to avoid
a complete collapse of the national economy’’,65 which included
‘‘closure of the illegal ports’’.65 In 1985, the Regie again
‘‘requested all manufacturers to stop DNP [duty not paid]
shipments’’.66 In February 1986, MOF Camille Chamoun
complained to B&W about financial losses to the government,
and the intention to put smugglers on trial and prohibit them
from doing business in Lebanon.67 On 16 June 1986, a letter by
the Ministry of Finance to Robert Gould (cultural attache´, US
Embassy in Lebanon) complained of the illegal trade through
Cyprus: ‘‘[I]f continued, [will] jeopardise many years of good
relations and total business to American companies that
amounts to 80 million dollars a year’’.68 However, industry
sources reported that ‘‘[m]ost observers judge that the
Government has neither the political will nor the military
strength’’ to effectively tackle the smuggling problem.65
The documents suggest these appeals had little effect on
contraband sales.69 A 1984 BAT report stated that TTCs ‘‘are
now treating transit business as a regular customer’’.70
Indeed, the prospect of gaining a manufacturing presence in
Lebanon was even seen as a potential threat to the profitable
contraband trade. Nick Brookes (BAT, NBD) noted that
‘‘the Cyprus export business would obviously be impaired if
we set up a business in Lebanon and import tariffs were
raised’’.71 Nick Gourlay (BAT, NBD) wrote to Keith Owen
(BAT, Human Resources) noting that ‘‘[r]egarding the longer
term, there are a number of different options for BAT to invest
in Lebanon, each involving influential local interests. These
options will need to be evaluated in the context of B&W’s
substantial existing export business to the Lebanese monopoly
(Regie)’’.72
The smuggling route to Lebanon: the role of transit agents
As elsewhere, TTCs worked through middlemen to supply
contraband to Lebanon. A key player from the mid 1970s was
Cyprus-based Kental Traders Limited, which received vast
consignments from BAT and smuggled them to the Middle
East and Africa. Cyprus has long been recognised as ‘‘a major
contract manufacturer and transit supplier to countries such as
Syria, Lebanon and Jordan’’.73 Emil Schildt, BAT’s transit
coordinator based in Hamburg,29 described Kental as
a very valuable customer for our [BAT] Group, who have
extensive connections in transit in Middle East, what they
proved during their 15 years agency for Lorillard and B&W.
During the period 1976–1981 for instance, Kental sold in transit
to Lebanon, Syria and Turkey more than 2 billion KENT.74
TA Macleod, of B&W Overseas based in Cyprus, claimed that
‘‘B&W through Kental, seized the opportunity of economic
chaos to launch a portfolio of US brands at penetration price
levels onto these markets’’.75 Consequently, market share
‘‘expanded rapidly and within eight years reached a peak of
53.2% of total Levant imports (1993)’’.75
The relationship between BAT and Kental is further revealed
in documents concerning BAT’s relationship with Lebanese
businessman, Souren Khanamirian. As a Regie board member
and parliamentary member, Khanamirian was recruited by BAT
to facilitate Kental’s operations in Lebanon. A report by the
Center on Public Integrity described this relationship:
BAT had contracted with Kental to pay a Lebanese trader named
Souren Khanamirian $2 for every case of cigarettes smuggled
into Lebanon. At the time, Khanamirian was a board member of
the Regie….Khanamirian complained in 1983 to BAT that he had
not received his commission on the shipment. BAT settled the
matter in March 1983 by paying the commission from its own
accounts directly to Khanamirian. BAT then billed Kental for
reimbursement. The BAT document notes that Khanamirian was
paid a commission for ‘‘transit deliveries that go to Lebenon
[sic].28
In 2001, Kental denied allegations of involvement.76
Eventually, Khanamirian’s services were terminated, with
B&W publicly denying knowledge of his involvement in
smuggling:
Brown & Williamson terminated its relationship with
Khanamirian because of his failure to perform. B&W did not and
does not condone the smuggling activities into and through
Lebanon. The civil strife and economic situation in Lebanon are
the cause of the lack of enforcement of customs law. It is the
Lebanese government’s responsibility to ensure compliance with
its customs laws.77
Another company that served as middleman was Cyprus-
based Peregrini, a subsidiary of the Abela Group, a major
Lebanese conglomerate. Peregrini served as a middleman for
B&W, as revealed through a legal case brought in 1989 by
Francois Mounayer, a former employee, for unfair dismissal.78
He alleged ‘‘smuggling into Lebanon, a hint of bribery, and
unlawful trading with Iran during the American hostage
crisis’’.79 He stated that ‘‘B&W’s intent was to sell its cigarettes
to Abela’s subsidiary which would, in turn, illegally smuggle
them into Lebanon’’.80 While the Regie had monopoly control
over imports, B&W documents state that ‘‘Peregrini has two
major customers for Kent de Luxe—the Lebanese Army and Mr
Tbeily, a gentleman of Jewish faith who resides in the
Lebanon’’.81 The relationship between Mounayer and B&W
soured over ‘‘parallel imports’’, a term used by the industry to
describe onward smuggling by middlemen to markets
unauthorised by the TTC. It was alleged that ‘‘B&W was
worried that if Mounayer was independently engaged in illegal
sales to other countries that it would somehow jeopardize
B&W’s position in the Middle East and result in business
losses’’.80 In 1983 B&W vice president Tom Whitehair wrote to
Abela requesting that ‘‘Mounayer be taken off our business
completely’’.80 In court, B&W denied the claims as ‘‘totally
without merit’’,77 pointing to Mounayer’s own admission that
he was ‘‘willingly engaged in illegal cigarette smuggling’’.80
B&W official response stated:
The nature of the cigarette business is such that Brown &
Williamson sells to a range of independent international whole-
salers and distributors. Where, when and to whom they sell the
product is a matter for the wholesaler concerned. Brown and
Williamson does not smuggle cigarettes … . The control of this
trade is ultimately the responsibility of the governments
concerned. Brown & Williamson has on numerous occasions,
either directly or through industry groups, urged local govern-
ments to take effective action to prevent this trade since it
damages Brown & Williamson’s efforts to lawfully conduct
business in these countries.77
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In 1990 B&W won the case ‘‘at minimal cost and without any
discovery’’.82
A conduit for supplying neighbouring countries
As well as a target market, Lebanon was a key ‘‘vehicle for
distribution’’ in the Middle East and Africa.83 The Levant region
(Lebanon, Cyprus, Syria and Jordan) was described as an
‘‘intertwined group of markets with very fluid and changing
channels of distribution’’.84 During the 1980s, ‘‘[o]ver half of all
imports [into Lebanon], legal and illegal, are then further
smuggled out to Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey’’.59 Kent and
Marlboro products smuggled through Lebanon were also found
in Israel.85
The most important among these secondary markets was
Syria,86 which, given an import ban in 1981,87 was only
accessible to TTCs through smuggling. With ‘‘porous borders
between the two countries’’,88 Lebanon was ‘‘an important
conduit cigarette market to Syria with additional volumes
of approximately 6 bns p.a being reexported [smuggled] to
Syria mainly because import duties in Lebanon are currently
very low’’.89 Consequently, ‘‘[v]irtually all imports were done
by the Regie, DNP and 5–6 bn would stay in Lebanon and 9–10
bn go across the border into Syria’’.90 In 1988 JK Booth
(BATUKE) requested Youseff Abdallah to survey BAT
brand availability following their supply, via the contraband
market, to Syria: ‘‘As you know, we recently supplied a
company called WORLDWIDE with Benson & Hedges
Special Filter for end destination Syria’’.91 Abdallah reported
back:
Many private ports feed freely the Syrian transit points, but,
basically through the Lebanese border town of Shetoura, which is
10 miles from the Syrian borders. The reason for the importance
of Shetoura as a main transit point into Syria, is the fact the
military presence of Syria starts from Shetoura and from there
into Lebon up to Beirut. We must always remember that the
Army is enjoying great influence and they are the spear head of
the transit Mafia. From Shetoura stocks are bought and sent
across a number of points over the hills in Mules and Jeep
vehicles—Into the Syrian border twons [sic], stocks are hidden in
many different under-ground stores, and only small quantities
are displayed in the wholesalers shops.92
Similarly, the Philip Morris board of directors described
extensive smuggling to Syria via Lebanon: ‘‘[Philip Morris]
dominate Lebanon with an overall market share of 65%
stressing however that although there are no direct [legal] sales
to Syria and Jordan the overflow [contraband] from Lebanon
generates estimated shares in these two markets of 18% and 9%,
respectively, again making us the leaders of the international
segment’’.61
BAT continued ‘‘to supply Kental in Cyprus with UK
manufactured stock … into Lebanon/Syria as transit’’93
throughout the 1980s ‘‘to respond to immediate opportunities
in what will continue to be a volatile environment’’.94 As Syrian
troops entered Lebanon, contraband flows increased:
The arrival of Syrian troops in West Beirut has resulted in a
loosening of the Syrian border, and fairly substantial quantities
are moving into the country via the Bekaa valley.…and Kental
has placed a series of orders to capitalize quickly on this
opportunity.95
New or substitute supply routes were established when
needed:
During the last quarter of 1986 the main route into Syria via the
Bekaa closed. As a result shipments were recovered via Tripoli,
thus allowing us to maintain access but at reduced volumes. In
early February the route via the Bekaa reopened and is expected
to remain open at least for the next 3 to 6 months. With the
arrival of Syrian troops in W. Beirut it is likely that goods will
now move even more freely.96
Indeed, Abdallah’s report of the Syrian market describes how
troops were a key part of the supply chain from Lebanon to
Syria and onwards:
An official transit operation-encouraged, handled and financed
by the Army troops, the Pole [Police] Force and the Security
Force—Every one gets a share of the profit’s cake. The transit
business is mainly an American Blend Market, and UK brands are
limited and their volume is mainly going to Jordan via Syrian
border points with Jordan.93
This corresponded with earlier reports by BAT that smug-
gling ‘‘in great Beirut [is] (under the control of the Lebanese
army aided by the Multi National Force)’’.97
Reliance on legal and illegal trade: ‘‘dual distribution channels
into key markets’’
By the late 1980s, three factors affected the contraband trade,
which led TTCs to reflect on their strategic use to facilitate
market access. First, the Lebanese government sought to take
over the trade itself. Given ineffectual appeals for TTCs, and an
inability to control border crossings and sales outlets ‘‘due to the
political situation and foreign occupation’’,98 the government
announced in October 1987 that ‘‘Lebanese transit ports’’ would
be ‘‘officially’’ closed. Under strict rules99 100 ‘‘the monopoly will
take full control of cigarette imports, thereby closing previous
routes for the importation of duty free [smuggled] cigarettes’’.101
The Regie ‘‘made arrangements with all ‘de facto’ zones from
the north to the south of Lebanon to ensure proper distribu-
tion’’.101 Local newspapers reported the Regie contracted several
private companies affiliated with, or having some connection
to, various local militia groups.102 These companies were paid
8% of Regie profits,103 and all smuggled cigarettes were to be
confiscated by them.104
This arrangement was solidified under Regie director-general
Salam who, upon assuming office in 1991, reached agreement
with the companies, agents and distributors smuggling through
Cyprus to route the products through the Regie. According to
Salam, ‘‘Instead of 50,000 [cases] sold through me and 50,000 of
smuggled products…now I got sold through me in the Regie
100,000 cases….We put down the smuggling and turnover
through me increased’’ (Interview with Walid Salam, 22 May
2006). Given direct supply to the Regie,105 Kental was ‘‘no longer
as influential as it was’’106 although it continued to collect
commission fees as B&W saw ‘‘[t]heir future use…in Syria
where they have good contacts’’.107 Correspondingly, onward
smuggling to neighbouring countries continued:
We sold it in Lebanon (like Marlboro) and others took it outside
on their own responsibility. It was their own problem. They took
it to Syria, Iran and Iraq. We did not do anything illegal since we
were not the ones smuggling, we are selling them here … but the
real market in Lebanon is between 50 to 55,000 cases…we
reached up to 120,000 cases a month. (Interview with Walid
Salam, 22 May 2006.)
TTCs anticipated the Regie’s attempts at controlling smug-
gling ‘‘to be limited and short-lived’’,60 and the strategy was
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criticised by the local media.108 None the less, by 1991 the
combined Lebanese-Syrian market reached ‘‘20 bns [sticks] per
annum, 13 bns believed to be imported via Cyprus. BWIT held
54% in 1989, PMI 28% and RJR 17%’’.109
A second factor affecting TTC strategy was the problem of
controlling the activities of middlemen. The ongoing problem of
‘‘parallel imports’’ by distributors, tempted by lucrative profits,
at times resulted in oversupply: ‘‘Parallel shipments have been
controlled over the quarter as far as possible, and in recent
weeks we have ceased shipments to Cyprus as a result of an
overstock situation arising in the Lebanon’’.110 In a 1988 job
description for a BATUKE Red Sea/central area manager, the
incumbent’s role was
To evaluate routes, prices and risks, then to recommend
action…to exercise judgement over sales/shipments when
markets are supplied by more than one source. Constant
vigilance is necessary in pricing because of the competitiveness of
the area and the problem of parallel shipments between various
territories within the Middle East and West Africa.111
The consequent downward pressure on prices threatened to
harm both local brands and legal imports. The Regie responded
by lowering the price of its brands so that ‘‘it is not worth the
amount of profit they got through smuggling’’ (Interview with
Walid Salam, 22 May 2006).
Third, the end of civil war in Lebanon in 1991 led to the
possibility that the Regie would revive local production and
legal imports. In 1993, Mike Baker (BAT, regional export
manager Middle East)112 observed that Cyprus/Levant remained
the ‘‘centre of GT business for the southern and eastern
Mediterranean’’,113 but anticipated that ‘‘within 2 years the
authorities in Lebanon will make substantial progress to
legitimise the tobacco industry’’.114 BAT reported disruption
that year to some smuggling routes which led to decreased
sales.114 Documents describe ‘‘a shift from current [illicit]
product sourcing’’ alongside a ‘‘more stable and…highly
competitive’’ Lebanese market.115 B&W thus predicted ‘‘a
continuing trend to duty paid business in Syria and Lebanon’’.116
Within this context, TTCs had a close interest in how the
Regie’s monopoly status might change. As previously, the
potential benefits of an agreement between BAT and the Regie
were carefully weighed against the risks to the contraband
trade. Of particular importance was Lebanon’s role within a
‘‘broader strategy for the Middle East, or at least Lebanon-Syria-
Jordan’’.116 B&W anticipated ‘‘a possibility that the Syrian
market will open to direct cigarette imports during 1992’’.117
This was eventually achieved in 1993 as the government sought
to combat smuggling to ‘‘gain additional customs and duties
revenues of USD 60 mn’’.118 B&W remained apprehensive that
‘‘[a]ny significant investment in Syria that increased domestic
capacity would be likely to disrupt the existing flow of product
from Lebanon to Syria’’.119 Thus, BAT sought an arrangement
with the Syrian Regie similar to that in Lebanon:
The Syrian market is approx. 13.5 bns for which the Syrian Regie
has capacity for only about half. The remainder is imported and
for which Lebanon acts as an important conduit. The Lebanese
Regie imports the product, and sells it to wholesalers who then
transit it to Syria. It would be in the best interests of the
Lebanese and Syrian Regies as well as the foreign manufacturers
if the business was dealt with between the two Regies, cutting
out the middle men. The Syrian Regie could pay the Lebanese in
Syrian pounds. Syria represents a big opportunity and the
Lebanon may hold the key to a combined market whose total
volume exceeds 19 bns per year.120
Concerns about competition from two revived Regies,
however, have proved premature given ongoing instability in
the region. Despite the end of the war, B&W noted that the
conflict was ‘‘unlikely to be resolved in the near future’’.121 This
prediction proved true, in turn impacting on cigarette imports
which declined by 60% between 1995 and 2002.122 The company
maintained ‘‘dual [legal and illegal] distribution channels into
key markets’’.118 It was concluded that ‘‘[b]ecause a number of
markets cannot meet demand (i.e. Lebanon, Syria,
Afghanistan), parallel shipments are filling the voids’’.123 In
2006, extensive smuggling still existed in the region.124
DISCUSSION
This review of industry documents reveals once again how the
contraband trade has been integral to TTC strategies to expand
market access in emerging markets. However, while cigarette
smuggling has been a global problem, Lebanon demonstrates the
particular challenges faced by countries with weak governance.
The domestic tobacco industry’s entanglement with particular
political factions has meant that policy has been driven by
economic, rather than public health, concerns. This is illustrated
by the government’s indecision over the Regie’s legal status, as
well as involvement of groups linked to militia groups to take
over the contraband trade in order to regain revenues, a general
practice that has kept the government weak to the present
day.125
Within this context, TTCs saw weak governance as an
opportunity to further its market access strategy. Resisting
appeals to cease supplying contraband to the country con-
tributed to the government’s revenue problems by undermining
Regie sales and circumventing import duties. TTCs recognised
the weak position of the government to address the smuggling
problem, seeking to use it as leverage to negotiate a manufac-
turing presence in Lebanon. As well as circumventing the
Regie’s monopoly control of imports, contraband was chan-
nelled through Lebanon to reach the closed markets of Syria,
Jordan and other neighbouring countries. Initially a means of
selling more cigarettes and building market share, often through
‘‘penetration price levels’’,75 smuggling became an important
part of broader objectives to secure a manufacturing presence in
the country. To date this has not been achieved because of
ongoing uncertainty about the Regie’s monopoly status amid
political instability.
The findings of this paper support the need for concerted
attention to cigarette smuggling in the Middle East through a
dedicated protocol of the FCTC. The crossborder nature of the
smuggling problem, confirmed by this analysis, requires
collective action across the region. Such a protocol should cover
tracing and tracking systems, obligations on TTCs to control
their supply chain, enforcement and prosecution mechanisms,
anti-money laundering measures, record keeping of imports and
exports, and sharing of information across countries.126
Importantly, this paper shows that the tobacco industry
should not participate in the negotiation of such a protocol, and
extreme caution should be exercised towards recent industry
overtures that appear to support stronger measures to tackle
smuggling. In 2007 Philip Morris and BAT signed memoranda of
understanding with the Lebanese MOF on anti-smuggling
activities as part of their corporate social responsibility
initiatives.127 128 Similarly, JTI have conducted anti-smuggling
events in cooperation with the Regie and customs officials.129
On 23 February 2008, Philip Morris organised a training session
for the Regie smuggling squad as part of the activities in the
agreed signed memorandum.130 Notably, such efforts have
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disingenuously focused on the separate issue of counterfeits,
which compete with the legal and illegal sale of genuine
products, and on ‘‘incentives and motivations’’ for smuggling
notably high tobacco taxation.131 While TTCs have continued to
publicly deny involvement in cigarette smuggling, the evidence
presented here adds to previous analyses of the complicity of the
tobacco industry in the contraband trade.
CONCLUSION
Cigarette smuggling, comprising around one-quarter of
exports,132 undermines public health by making cheaper cigar-
ettes more readily available and, in turn, encouraging increased
consumption.133 The tobacco industry benefits from gaining
access to closed or regulated markets, increasing revenues,134 and
discouraging governments from raising tobacco taxes.135
Countries such as Lebanon, which face chronic political and
economic instability, are particularly vulnerable to such
activities. Collective action is needed, both regionally and
globally, to achieve a designated FCTC protocol to effectively
tackle this global problem, as well as increased support to
countries such as Lebanon in implementing its measures.
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